










                                                            Philosophical Ethics of Happiness: 
                                             Rethinking of Farabi’s Treatise “Attainment of Happiness” 
     It is possible to discuss about “happiness” and “ethics” as its basis from different disciplines and approaches that “philosophical” may be one of them. Although today (for different reasons) speaking about these subject matters is not very easy or without any challenges but dialectically this dominant unfavorable atmosphere makes it a necessary and inviting duty to take related challenges serious and important.
        The compound term of “philosophical ethics” reminds the engaged minds of scholars Nicomachean Ethics and Aristotle who is one of the core figures in the contemporary academic discussions about ethics, but I should say that by the term of philosophical ethics, for example I do not mean contemporary discussions of Habermas in contrast with Gadamer (R.C. Bartlett & S.D. Collins 1999, 37), but Farabi who is one of the first forerunner or more precisely founding fathers of the philosophical ethics field in the medieval Islamic Arabic world (M. Fakhry 1991, 78).  
            As the Farabi’s monograph shows he wants to write about “happiness” or, more correctly, “attainment” of it (in comparison with understanding, interpreting, pursuing, liking …). Can this title give us some primary and important hints before entering the main body of his text as a whole?  The title “Attainment of Happiness” can mean that he wants to speak about “happiness” and (perhaps) not “perfection”, for it seems that happiness is more practical and realizable than perfection. Thereby, he writes about actualization of a realizable theme. Moreover, felicity is a whole with multi –levels and all of them overall will be experienced as happiness (M. Mahdi 2001, ix – all references are to this edition.) Besides, we expect that his main arguments or the large part of the treatise is oriented towards the different ways of or howness of felicity attainment and we should not be surprised if there is no or only implicit discussions about whatness and definition of it!   
            The First section of Farabi’s treatise confirms our above-initial intuitional reading of its title. We read: ”The human things through which nations and citizens of cities attain earthly happiness in this life and supreme happiness in the life beyond are of four kinds: theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues, and practical arts” (Mahdi, Sec., 1, p. 13). Felicity not only belongs both to this and that world , but also there is not a China Wall between these two, for it is a whole and not a monolithic totality which has many interconnected (not disconnected separated) layers that according to this passage are four – a kind of quadruple.       
            More importantly, why does he begin the first line and also section of his treatise “Attainment of Happiness’ with “things that are humane”?  The word things (ashya) as an Arabic philosophical word has a variety of senses and roughly it corresponds to “being” and according to Mahdi in this paragraph it can signify particulars or universals (Mahdi, Note to 59 – 1, P. 141). Besides, the statement that these things have human color and quality may mean that he wants to write a practical treatise about happiness of human beings through human things. The compound term of “human things” can mean things human in both particular and universal dimensions. Is it possible to interpret that human beings have both particular and universal felicity? If affirmative, happiness has both particular and universal aspects; it means that human beings have a universal felicity in combining and intertwining of all of the four mentioned kinds and at the same time with regard to each one of them particularly by gaining their specific happiness.      
         But more importantly for the purpose of this paper, it seems that there is a rationale and logic behind the arrangement and order of the human things for the first human thing is “theoretical virtues”, then “deliberative virtues”, after that “moral virtues”, and at last “practical art”. Accordingly, for gaining happiness we should begin from “theoretical virtues” and step by step go through “deliberative virtues” then “moral virtues” and lastly “practical arts”. Can this arrangement be otherwise? What is the intention of Farabi in proposing such an order? For this paper the situation of ethics and morality is the main issue that shapes its subject matter. And in this regard it is our hypothesis that for understanding ethics we have to examine it against the hybrid background of theoretical and deliberative virtues and thereby connect ethics as a discussion about “human character” with morality as logos or speaking about “good and bad”. According to this account, we can say that ethics /morality is not autonomous and independent but is dependent on a combination of intellection and deliberation and this version of ethics/morality may lead to happiness (Mahdi, Sec., 34). For verifying this statement let us begin with Farabi’s discussion about ethics (as speaking about human character in both its individual and collective aspects) and the way it should be transmitted and advanced into morality.          
             Without entering the disputable historical account about the Arabic word “akhlaq” (that in Arabic is used both for ethics and morality) and its technical use in Farabi’s treatise, it is acceptable that akhlaq / ethics has some necessary relations with “soul / psyche” therefore when he speaks of this term he means soul of man in contradistinction of every other alive or dead entity. Thus ethics has a relation with soul of man that makes his/her nature human (it seems comparable with Aristotle’s account in: A. loizou & H. lesser, 1990, PP.35, 36). But this term is ambiguous and unclear, therefore it needs more discussion in order to become clear and in this regard we have to see what Farabi thinks. 
            For understanding Farabi’s speculations about character, we have to consider and examine some categories. He introduces mainly two states or conditions for human character at both individual and collective (as nation, city, and group) levels, therefore for comprehending human quality, we have to know that there is not merely one state for man and then examine what are these two and their interrelations. In “Attainment of Happiness” about the individual level of human character, Farabi speaks of natural and volitional states of human character as an innate disposition in human beings that moves man in its specific direction until it encounters with obstacles (Ibid., Sec., 36, P. 34). But human beings are not only and merely natural beings, of so they are incomplete. Moreover, humans have will and volition for completing or managing their innate natural dispositions and thereby the introduction of ethics and morality as speaking of goodness and badness. Character of human beings as ethical beings cannot stop at the natural level but it should go further and in other words becomes sublime. Thus these two states of human character should interplay with each other and transform ethics as a science about characters into a science about the good and the bad - therefore in contrast to modern separation of ethics and morality in Farabi (like Aristotle) we can see their identity. It means that here Farabi makes an interconnection or bridging between ethics as about habits, ethos and character on one hand and ethics as we usually understand as about the good and bad on the other hand. How does he translate the initial earlier meaning of ethics into its second later one?  He does it at two levels by introducing the category of “end / telos” and the role of “rational” background of both natural and human virtues. Accordingly, every entity and being in the world has an end and spontaneously, unconsciously, consciously and volitionally is moving or should move towards it. For Farabi in human sphere all the ends are not at the same level and value but they can be classifies at three broad levels: truly good; may be bad; and believed to be good (Mahdi, Sec., 27, P. 28). Therefore human character becomes moral and ethical with regard to the end that the individual chooses and assigns for it and then gathers and manages all the other things in this course. Human character in itself is something neutral and unmoral but when is directed toward some specific good, bad, and believed good it takes human and moral quality and is not any more neutral and natural – an instance of the interplay between will and nature.         
         But as we mentioned beside this individual level of human character, Farabi introduces the collective level with multiple examples too. Interestingly, it seems that for Farabi collectivities such as nations and cities have no character of their own but he gives no reasons for his statement. But it is clear that in comparison with human beings that have a character of their own the mentioned collectivities have no character but should have. Accordingly, he writes about the various “ways” and “agents” that should “habituate” nations, cities and in fact their inhabitants and citizens “in doing that issue from the practical states of character by arousing them the resolution to do these acts… (Mahdi, Sec., 39, P. 35). Therefore without any exceptions the character of all the people who live in this or that nation and city should be formed and shaped by the supreme “ruler” and “superintendent”, under different titles in different languages , although he can delegate this responsibility to other individuals and groups that continue the formation of the other people’s characters under his supervision. Meanwhile, it seems that at this macro level the identity of ethics and morality or the transformation of knowledge of character into knowledge of good and bad is basically dependent on the supreme ruler or a few elite and for this reason in the related sections we observe a great emphasis on the supreme “leader” and “superintendent”. On the whole and as a rule, character formation at large scale and spread (not individual) is a social and collective-oriented duty and task. But all those who live in a nation or city are not on the same level and in other words equal, for they occupy a specific rank in the order of being and humanity and on this basis there should be different ways for forming their characters. With regard to the reactions, condition and actualities of the people, Farabi speaks mainly of three ways: consent; compulsion and combination of these both. If it is all of Farabi’s account, it seems too pragmatic! But it is not so, for this account leans on a notional and conceptual explanation and accordingly people will be classified and the different sciences will emerge (Mahdi, Sec., 44, 45, 46, P. 39). Therefore formation of characters in the collectivities such as nation and city is dependent on a specific kind of philosophy that is beyond practical one.                          
             According to the above-mentioned account, “character” in both its “individual” and “collective” levels in their own ways needs a specific kind of reasoning and intellection. For example at the individual level, the natural and human / volitional virtues and ethics should be both understood and realized. In other words, to understand and at the same time practice natural/human virtues we need specific reason.  Accordingly and simultaneously, each one needs its appropriate and specific theoretical and practical background; it means that natural virtue of the natural state needs natural rationality and human virtue of the volitional state human one. This statement points to the practical philosophical backing of ethics although the latter cannot be self-enclosed, self-referent and independent field and subject.   
        For Farabi ethics in its identity with morality is concerned with “voluntary” (that is human things) in contradistinction of the things natural, arbitrary, spontaneous, and the like. Human beings in contrast to the other living beings have “will” and can think and practice the things they like at a specific event, time and place and thereby we are facing with something exclusively human that can be called voluntary ideas, doings, and things. On other words, human beings as the only ethical beings act morally in different and variable accidents and states. More or less, for Farabi the variable accidents are mainly the specific time, place, and event and according to our will we practice an ethical practice in variable and different places, times and events. And all these will be realized by a definite human faculty called “deliberation” as the skill and the faculty by which one discovers and discerns the variable accidents of the intelligibles whose particular instances are made to exist by the will, when one attempts to bring them into actual existence by the will at a determined time, in a determined place, and when a determined event takes place,…”(Mahdi, Sec., 26, PP. 27, 28). When we remember Aristotle’s account about the two divisions of the rational part of soul in Book VI of “Nicomachean Ethics”, we read that one part admits of contemplating about things which admit of variation and he calls it faculty, then Aristotle continues:                                       “” (NE Book VI. I, 1139 a.) More importantly, this deliberation is a “human deliberative” faculty and a virtue, and should be differentiated from the “natural deliberation” that is a kind of natural innate “cleverness” that is pre-ethical that can even sometimes in some cases be anti – or immoral. These notions gradually pave the way for and remind us the necessity of another more basic antecedent faculty that seems to be theoretical virtue and in Farabi is equal to philosophy – as his treatise “Attainment of Happiness” ends with discussion about it (Mahdi, Sections 53 - 62).     
     Why it is so that deliberation virtue and reason as the gate of entrance into ethics / morality in micro/individual and macro/communal levels is dependent and subordinate to theoretical virtue and reasoning. According to Farabi, in micro level deliberation merely discerns the accidents and states of the intelligibles that are acquires by theoretical virtue and reason thus it should follow the theoretical reason. Therefore principally at first theoretical reason should do its function that is, comprehending the invariable intelligibles and then secondly the deliberation reason goes toward it in order to discover their variable states and accidents accordingly the first should occur before the second (Mahdi, Sec., 34, 35, P. 32). We read such a tenor in Aristotle too:      ” VIvii, a  
             There are the same explicit and implicit content in Farabi’s discussion of ethics / morality in macro level. Here we observe a kind of interconnection between the necessary sciences for forming the character of different rankings of the inhabitants and citizens of the nations and cities that in their turn lead to different sciences. It means that with regard to the stratification of people in order to the supreme “leader” and “superintendent” attain the aim of forming different characters on the macro level, Farabi suggests that this three basic sciences are needed: theoretical sciences; popular theoretical sciences; and image-making theoretical sciences we can see that the genus of all is theoretical reason as the first science too. Therefore the initial theoretical sciences should be appropriated on different levels with regard to the potentialities and ranks of inhabitants and citizens. It means that some people can know and understand intelligibles through demonstrations, some persuasion, and some images. Thereby on the macro level of ethics/morality we observe interplay among these sciences and ranks of people with the authority and priority of theoretical reason and virtue.  
             Accordingly, we should search for and examine Farabi’s conception of the nature and quality of this theoretical faculty and reason that corresponds with philosophy and derivation of the philosophical from it. Interestingly, he begins his discussion about philosophy with a historical diachronic version of it. It means that initially and generally the Greek understand it “as the quest and the love for the highest wisdom” (Mahdi, Sec., 53, P. 43), of course here “the highest” has a specific tenor and means openness and recourse of philosophy to other wisdoms, arts, and virtues and not its independent and self-enclosure. As a Greek evidence for Farabi’s statement we can mention to the Aristotle’s statement in “Nicomachean Ethics”: “NE VI.vii. 19-20). According to Farabi after this broad general conception, philosophy becomes equal to competence in any art that leads to actions and by it the concerned individual can become competent practitioner (Mahdi, Sec., 53, P. 43). His statement reminds us of Aristotle too: 
 “” (NE VI.vii. 9-10).  Accordingly, philosophy as a historical category at its initial beginning equals to “unqualified wisdom” but afterwards it becomes thin, partial, and departmental that corresponds and limits to “qualified wisdom”, therefore nowadays when we speak of the “philosophical” we mean “practical”. But with regard to the religious background and context of Farabi it is not a sufficient account. Farabi understand this point and in the context of defining philosophy pays a rather long attention to religion (as a general category in about one page and a half. Mahdi, Sec., 55, P. 44-45) and this time tries to restate his account of “philosophy” and “the philosophical” in “analogy” with religion.   
        In an “analogical correspondence” between religion and philosophy he completes his version of philosophy. It means that philosophy and religion in its own specific methods comprise the same subjects and give an account of the first principle and the ultimate end of man. Therefore they are counterpart in their own ways that is , while philosophy seeks comprehension through intellect and assent by the method of demonstration religion seeks comprehension through imagination and assent by persuasion. 
       Accordingly, philosophy and religion (noting that philosophy is prior to religion in time) make the subjects understandable and comprehensible; it means first principle or cause and ultimate end of man through intellect by demonstration and imitation by persuasion respectively. Therefore philosophy and religion have a kind of commonality but realize it differently and on this basis we have to understand Farabi’s statement about philosophy with regards to its analogy with religion too.      
         Up to now with considering these notions about philosophy and connecting them together it can be suggested that for Farabi “philosophical” as a term means the wisdom that is “unqualified, intellectual and demonstrable”. Besides, the same term has many features and in speaking of philosophy, we should consider and mention to them otherwise our statement is not precise and sound. In this context it is possible to classify these features in these two main pairs: perfect / defect; and true / mutilated. As regards the first pair, perfect philosophy contains both theoretical / practical virtues but if restricted to the theoretical ones it is defective (Mahdi, Sec., 54, P. 43). Accordingly, philosophy cannot be self-contained but it should have other-regarding and in appropriate ways do something for the other people according to their capabilities. Therefore the affirmative features of perfect philosophy in contradistinction of defect philosophy are intertwining of its theoretical, practical and potential characteristics.
      As regards the second pair true/mutilated, here true philosophy means the existence of theoretical and practical things in the soul of legislator in comparison with religion that the same things exist in the soul of multitude. It is noteworthy that Farabi discuses more about mutilated philosophy and its three kinds than the true one. “False philosophy” (with relatively more discussion and extension than the other two) is a kind of philosophy that in it theoretical sciences are acquired by the philosopher without achieving the utmost perfection as the capability to introduce others to what he knows in so far as their capacity permits. Then there is “vain philosophy”, as learning the theoretical sciences without going further and without being habituated to doing the acts considered virtuous by a certain religion or the generally accepted noble acts. And lastly, Farabi mentions to “counterfeit philosophy” as studying theoretical sciences without being naturally equipped for them (Mahdi, Se. 60, 61 P. 48). According to this account, “false philosophy” has no true conception of and readiness for the purpose of philosophy; in “vain philosophy” inclinations and appetites are dominant; and in “counterfeit philosophy” unsuitable dispositions have priority. Therefore when Farabi speaks of true philosophy he has both positive aspect of the existence of theoretical and practical sciences in the legislator’s soul and at the same time by this term he negated misunderstanding of philosophy purpose across the dominance of inclinations and dispositions. 
            As conclusion, Farabi explains his account for attaining human happiness that seems a more practical available and accessible thing than theoretical pursuit of perfection. With considering discussion about happiness as a human category he pays rather detailed attention to the human things through which as a whole this supreme happiness may be realized. And among these we have concentrated on the ethics / morality and its position and function in actualization of felicity here and there. It seems that although immediate and direct intertwining of ethics / morality in micro/individual and macro/collective levels is based on deliberation faculty/ virtue but this reason is not independent and autonomous but dependent to the theoretical sciences that are equal to philosophy. Thereby Farabi introduces a kind of “philosophical ethics” (philosophical as a perfect, true, unqualified, demonstrable intellection) for attainment of happiness and through this background and support realization of human happiness is feasible and possible.                             
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